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A hijacked-account campaign stole CI secrets from 1,835 GitHub repos

Starting 10 November, an attacker used 4,837 compromised GitHub accounts to probe 61,764 repositories, ran a credential-stealing payload in at least 1,835 of them, then deleted the workflow logs.

Source: Aikido Security

An attacker used 4,837 compromised GitHub accounts to open probe pull requests against 61,764 repositories starting at roughly 12:45 UTC on 10 November, according to research published by Aikido Security. At least 1,835 of those repositories went on to run a credential-stealing payload the researchers call “wfx”, before the attacker deleted the workflow run logs to cover the tracks.

wfx pulls GitHub Actions secrets, the workflow’s GITHUB_TOKEN, and OIDC tokens, then uses them to reach further credentials for AWS, Azure, GCP, Docker, Kubernetes, npm, PyPI, Git and SSH, down to shell history for tools like psql and node. It can exchange a stolen OIDC token for cloud sessions, forge status checks to slip past branch protection, and inject federated identity credentials into Azure AD apps. Aikido flags pull requests titled “docs: dependency audit notes”, branches named wfx-docs or chore/[a-z0-9]{8}, and commits reading “ci: refresh build cache” or “chore: add ci helper” as the indicators to search for:

git log --all --grep="ci: refresh build cache" --grep="chore: add ci helper"

Why it matters: if any of those indicators turn up in your history, treat every secret and cloud role your workflows could reach as compromised, not just the ones you can confirm were used, since the run logs that would tell you are gone.

The caveat: the accounts used to push this were themselves compromised in earlier supply-chain attacks, so the same campaign can resurface through accounts nobody has flagged yet.

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